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Full text of "My country and my people"

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cause the nation to settle into a state of permanent depression-mania. As events proved, the tide of rising demand for resistance, whether China was ready or not, was so strong that it swept everything before it and nearly engulfed Chiang Kaishek himself at Sian. Chiang Kaishek could not have survived at Sian had he not been able to convince his captors of his sincerity in deciding to resist further foreign aggression, an idea which was firmly and clearly and actively in his mind, but which he had refused publicly to declare to the nation as a whole.
The peculiar angle in this situation was that while Chiang Kaishek was actively planning for the inevitable conflict, he was also playing for time and the nation was left completely in the dark, without knowledge of a promised leadership for a war of national liberation. For at Nanking there sat the supreme chess-player of the Far East, and one of the greatest political chess-players of all time. A good chess-player is a cool player, and this great enigmatic personality, whom I had watched rise to fame and power for ten years, could be inhumanly cool. On top of his coolness, his fine calculations, his stubbornness (unusually un-Chinese), he was also a man who acted, but kept his own counsel and refused to explain his attitude to the nation. The "inhuman coolness" of Chiang was proved, not only in his ordering Chang Hsuehliang to give up the whole of Manchuria without fighting, but also in his refusal to Support the Nineteenth Route Army in the Shanghai War of 1932, even after the gauntlet had been thrown down, and, as far as the people were concerned, China was already fighting Japan. This was not a possible attitude for a common mortal with common passions like myself. As is evident in this case, he was also a man who knew he was right, even if the whole nation condemned him and even if he stood all alone, He thought China was not ready, not only in regard to military training and equipment, but principally in that China was not sufficiently unified. The war of Shanghai was in the spring of 1932, but he had fought Wang Chingwei, Chang Fakwei, Shih Yushan, Tang Shengchih and the Kwangsi Generals, Li Tsungjen and Pai Tsunghsi, in middle and south China only in 1929, had fought Wang Chingwei, Feng Yiihsiang and